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Is Eastern Europe UniformlyAnti­Immigrant? Not so fast.
Understanding immigration policy positions
and policy change in Eastern Europe*
As the European Union struggled to address an unprecedented influx of refugeesin 2015, four Eastern European governments rejected a proposal for EuropeanUnion refugee quotas. Within each country, however, there are different views onthe migrant crisis and immigration in general that are overshadowed by thisuniform policy response. My research on the political divisions in each countryexplains that these differences are related to how political camps developed aftercommunism. Through an analysis of the causes of immigration salience and thereasons behind immigration and integration policy positions of various parties inEastern European countries, this research finds that which party – left or right –adopts more socially liberal policy positions depends on its relationships tocommunist federalism and the most politically notable ethnic group in thecountry. My work finds three distinct political patterns in Eastern Europe.
* L'auteur adhère à lacharte de déontologie du LIEPPdisponible en ligne et n'a déclaréaucun conflit d'intérêt potentiel.
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Jan Rovny is an AssistantProfessor of Political Science atSciences Po (Paris) attached to theCentre d’études européennes (CEE)and the Laboratory for theInterdisciplinary Evaluation ofPublic Policy (LIEPP) and aresearcher at the University ofGothenburg.
Alors que l’Union Européenne a fait face à un afflux de réfugiés sans précédenten 2015, quatre gouvernements d’Europe de l’Est ont rejeté la proposition demise en place de quotas de réfugiés au sein de l’Union. Toutefois, à l’intérieur deces pays, les positions diffèrent concernant la crise des migrants et l’immigrationen général mais ces différences sont éclipsées par cette réponse uniforme à laréforme proposée. Ma recherche sur les divisions politiques propres à chacun deces pays montre que ces différences sont liées au développement de différentspartis politiques après la chute du communisme. À travers une analyse descauses de l’importance de l’immigration et des raisons expliquant lespositionnements politiques des différents partis en Europe de l’Est sur cesquestions, cette recherche démontre que l’adoption de politiques socialementlibérales par un parti – qu’il soit de gauche ou de droite – dépend de sa relationau communisme fédéral, mais également du lien qu’il entretient avec le groupeethnique national le plus important d’un point de vue électoral. Mon travail faitapparaître trois modèles politiques distincts en Europe de l’Est.
ABSTRACT
The European migrant crisis came to a head in 2015 with swells of displaced peoplefrom across the Middle East and North Africa entering the European Union member states.The path to Europe for many went through parts of Eastern Europe, drudging up for thefirst time in these states the issue of how to handle such an influx and how to shapeimmigration policy, more generally. The strong anti-immigrant rhetoric of nationalleadership from Budapest to Warsaw captured headlines and the initial uniform critique of aEuropean Union proposal to impose refugee quotas[1] on its member states painted a
*This work was supported by a public grant overseen by the French National Research Agency (ANR) as partof the ‘‘Investissements d’Avenir’’ program LIEPP (ANR-11-LABX-0091, ANR-11- IDEX-0005-02), and bythe Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet), grant number 421-2012-1188. The author would like tothank Jessica Flakne for research assistance and editorial support.[1] Alison Smale and Dan Bilefsky, “Quota Proposal Fails to Gain Traction as Germany Prepares for MoreArrivals,” in New York Times (12/09/2015) : http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/world/europe/europe-migrant-crisis.html?_r=1.
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t. picture of an Eastern Europe unified by an anti-immigrant policy stance. These seemingly unitedviewpoints, however, mask the fact that there issignificant policy differentiation among politicalparties at the country-level throughout the region.In fact, some Eastern European politicians areproponents of supporting the migrants[2] andvoluntarily increasing acceptance of refugees[3]from conflict zones. Others oppose welcomingnon-European refugees altogether, and would onlyaccept migrants they deem easily assimilable.[4] So,what accounts for these varying stances? And howdo attitudes towards immigration in EasternEurope map onto existing political divisions?Existing scholarship on Eastern Europeanpolitics predicts that party competition in theregion is determined by various past experienceswith communism, pitting the old state-centricauthoritarianism against a new liberal marketeconomic system. As such, the region’s experiencewith communism is thought to tie left-wingeconomics to social conservatism and theeconomic right to pro-democratic socialliberalism.[5] Recent empirical evidence, however,exposes significant variance in party competitionpatterns across East European countries that arenot accounted for by the dominant explanatoryframeworks for party competition in the region –communist regime types and democratic transitionexperience.My research supports the argument thatparty competition in Eastern Europe isdetermined by the interaction of two factors: acountry’s past experience with communistfederalism and partisan responses to ethnicminorities. The argument follows in three steps:(1) Due to historical institutional determinants,politically notable ethnic minorities associate withspecific political forces; (2) Given their interest ingroup rights, including citizenship, and theirskepticism towards the repressive capacity of the(majority controlled) state, ethnic minorities holdliberal preferences[6]; (3) the liberal interests ofethnic minorities are consequently translated intothe general socially liberal positions of the politicalactors affiliated with or tolerant of theseminorities.[7] Following this argument, I theorizeand show the conditions under which politicalparties throughout Eastern Europe adopt sociallyliberal versus conservative views, therebydemonstrating the role ethnicity plays in formingthe underlying ideological structure of partycompetition.Applying this argument to policy positionson the migrant crisis and immigration being takenthroughout Eastern Europe reveals a morecomplex ideological structuring of politics thangenerally accepted. In some Eastern Europeancountries, it is the left-wing that adopts sociallyliberal positions paving the way toward greateropenness to immigration. In other countries, it is
the right-wing that takes this position. Thedetermining factor in all cases, as my researchshows, is the party’s past relationship tocommunist federalism and to the most politicallynotable ethnic group in the country. Thus, I findthree distinct political patterns across EasternEurope that underpin the divergent policypositions taken on immigration.
1.Patterns of left­right positions onimmigration in Eastern Europe
1.1 Relation to Communist Federations –secession matters.
The first pattern emerges in EasternEuropean countries that began their transition todemocracy by seceding from a communistfederation such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia.These secessionist countries include Croatia,Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. Breaking away fromthe communist federal center often led to thenewly formed state harboring a significant numberof ethnic nationals from the old federal center --Russians or Serbs. Politically speaking, this federaldiaspora tends to identify with the communistlegacy, and subsequently with the CommunistParty, its successors, or other left-wing parties.These left parties become either tacit supportersor the active representatives of the diaspora ethnicinterest. Thus, in these cases, there is a departurefrom the expected party competition frameworkthat would predict leftist parties to adopt ethno-national conservatism.Over time, these left party affinities withethnic minorities promote left-wingmulticulturalism and the relationship betweeneconomic left-right placement on the politicalspectrum and immigration is similar to what is
[2] TOP 09: Pomozme potřebným, trvejme však nadodržování pravidel. http://www.top09.cz/proc-nas-volit/fakta-a-argumenty/top-09-pomozme-potrebnym-trvejme-vsak-na-dodrzovani-pravidel-18846.html.[3] “Poland considers accepting higher number ofimmigrants,” in The Warsaw Voice online, (10/09/2015) :http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/32974/news.[4] "Premier: Privital by, keby sa prestalo s moralizovanim naadresu V4," http://strana-smer.sk/premier-privital-keby-sa-prestalo-s-moralizovanim-na-adresu-v4.[5] Rovny (2014), "Communism, Federalism, and EthnicMinorities", p. 670. Kitschelt 1992 ; Marks, Hooghe,Nelson, and Edwards 2006 ; Vachudova qnd Hooghe2009 ; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009..[6] Rovny (2014), "Communism, Federalism, and EthnicMinorities", p. 670. “The sociocultural dimensioncombines preferences on noneconomic issues,juxtaposing traditional, paternalistic, authoritative, andnationalist views with egalitarian, liberal, and alternativeoutlooks; Kitschelt 1994; Marks et al. 2006. See Rovny2014, Section 3. While ethnic minorities are not alwaysliberal on all components of the sociocultural dimension,such as religious and moral issues, they tend tosystematically favor liberal policies regarding group rights,citizenship, and law-and-order issues (see the discussion inthe theoretical section of this article).”.[7] Rovny (2014), "Communism, Federalism, and EthnicMinorities", p. 670.LIE
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found in Western Europe -- the left has moreliberal views on immigration policies. In fact, inthese countries the association between ethnicinterests and the economic left is such that ethnicminorities frequently support and vote for theeconomic left-wing parties (see Figure 1). Thesesubsequently support more liberal immigration andencourage multicultural approaches for integratingimmigrants. In contrast, the economic rightsupports anti-immigrant policies and ispredominantly assimilationist.[8]
1.2 Presence of prominent Ethnic Minoritiesnot from the old federal center.
Turning to countries that did not breakaway from a communist federal center, the secondpattern occurs in countries that have dominantethnic minorities not originating from an ex-federalcenter, such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania andSlovakia. Because the ethnic minorities in thesecountries are not tied to a former federal center,the left parties that have emerged since 1989 donot exhibit particular ethnic affinities. They are notprone to the same cultural openness characteristicof left economic parties in countries following thefirst pattern. In fact, these second pattern leftistparties either sideline ethnic issues, or mobilizenational chauvinism to rejuvenate their left-wingideology, which had been compromised by the fallof communism. Consequently, the left tendstowards conservative views regarding all “others.”In contrast, the opposition to communism in thesecountries supports market economic outlookscoupled with social liberalism, which in turnpredisposes right-wing parties to be moresympathetic to the concerns of ethnic minorities.As in the first case, these left-right positionsinform the views of respective political partiestowards immigrants and policy. As such, left-wingvoters are prone to oppose immigration (see Figure2), which is the opposite of what we find inWestern Europe (see Figure 3) where thecompetition pattern is such that left-wingeconomics espouses social liberalism and thoseholding positions on the economic right holdsocially conservative views.[9] And instead, it is thepolitical right-wing that supports immigration andmulticulturalism.An additional observation from these initialtwo patterns is that in both country groups, ethnicminorities tend overall to be more open toimmigration than the majority of the population,regardless of the country’s relation to communistfederalism (See Figure 4 on the next page). Thesefindings emphasize the intimate ideologicalrelationship between views on ethnic minorityrights and immigration in Eastern Europe, whichcan then be understood as an indicator for policypositions.
3
[8] Rovny (2014), “The other ‘other’: Party responses to immigration in eastern Europe”, p. 647.[9] Rovny (2014), "Communism, Federalism, and Ethnic Minorities", p. 672 : Van de Brug and van Spanje 2009.
Figure 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3:
1.3 Ethnic Homogeneity
The final pattern emerges in countriesthat are ethnically homogenous, and do not haveany politically relevant ethnic minority groups.Subsequently, the structure of party competitionin these countries is not significantly influenced byethnic minority issues. This group includesHungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (whichwas a federal center). Research shows that whatmatters in these particular contexts is the extent towhich the former communist party reformed interms of party ideology and subsequent positions.Nonetheless, social liberalism, and, with it, thepositions on immigration, are again rooted inviews on nationalism and ethnic minorities. Onthe one hand, the Czech Republic is home to anintransigent Communist party that represents aleft-wing rousable by ethnic nationalism aimedagainst the historical, but no longer present,German minority. Today, the party takes a negativestance on the refugee crisis devoid of anysolidaristic language, rather proposing to take theEuropean Commission to the Court of Justice.[10]On the other hand, Polish and Hungarian politicsare defined by reformist post-communists whoadopted liberal stances in the 1990s, only to beeclipsed by their nationalist right-wing opponentsin the 2000s. Here, it is the conservative right thatvocally opposes immigration, while the left(quietly) presents a more conciliatory stance.Furthermore, in Hungary, the right-wing led byVictor Orban draws much of its current political
identity from its nationalistic support of extra-territorial Hungarian nationals. He and his politicalparty have extensively opposed the acceptance ofrefugees, which resonates with the preferences ofthe right-wing supporters, while the supporters ofthe left-wing hold significantly more liberalviews.[11] Interestingly, and in line with thegeneral trends, the Hungarian minority party inSlovakia (Most-Hid) presents one of the mostsupportive positions towards migrants, pointingout that migration might bring benefits to thereceiving countries.[12] The recent 2015 nationalelection campaign in Poland extensively contestedimmigration policy, with the leader of the winningright-wing nationalist party playing up xenophobicsentiments.[13]
2. Policy Outcomes Based on thesePatterns
There are thus diverse views onimmigration policy and the current migration flowin Eastern Europe. This variance is stronglyrelated to views of ethnic minorities, andnationalism. The ongoing migration crisis has putthe issue of immigration, which was hitherto onlymarginal in the political discourses in the region,into the spotlight. As such, the crisis has greatlyheightened the salience of immigration andasylum policy, and made it a significant politicaltopic. Simultaneously, the real or potential inflowof migrants of culturally different backgroundshas created a significant political opportunity forpolitical entrepreneurs. While parts of EasternEurope have witnessed a shift towardsconservative and nationalist politics prior to themigration crisis (the continuing strength of VictorOrban’s Fidesz party, and the waning support ofthe liberal government in Poland prior to the 2015election), the migration crisis offered nationalistpoliticians a potent topic for mobilizing voters.Victor Orban, as well as Jaroslaw Kaczynski, haveseized this opportunity.In terms of specific policy changesrelated to the migration crisis, there are twofactors to consider. First is the political color ofthe government, which determines the likelihoodthat the government adopts liberal or conservativestances on the migration issue, in line with thethree political patterns discussed above. Secondfactor is whether or not the country lies on theBalkan migration route. Table 1 provides anoverview of immigration policy changesimplemented by eastern European governments inthe fall of 2015. It considers the restriction ofmovement by imposing border controls, or theadjustment of legislation concerning migration. Inaddition, the table also presents the rhetoric of thegovernment concerning migration, as this maydiffer from actual policy implementation.The table highlights two key patterns.First, all countries on the Balkan migration routeclosed their borders, no matter their political4
[10] Vojtěch Filip, Otázky Václava Moravce, Česká Televize.13.9.2015.[11] “Hungarians Fear of Migrants and Terrorism” inHungarian Spectrum (18/12/2015) :http://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/12/18/hungarians-fear-of-migrants-and-terrorism/[12] ”MIGRÁCIA: Solidarita a zodpovednosť sa nevylučujú”Most-Hid official website: http://www.most-hid.sk/sk/migracia-solidarita-zodpovednost-sa-nevylucujuConsulted 14.9.2015[13] Jan Cienski, “Migrants carry ‘parasites and protozoa,’warns Polish opposition leader,” in Politico.eu (14/10/15)http://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-asylum-poland-kaczynski-election/
L
IE
P
P
p
o
lic
y
b
ri
e
f
#
2
4
-
m
a
rs
2
0
1
6
Is
E
a
s
te
rn
E
u
ro
p
e
U
n
if
o
rm
ly
A
n
ti
-I
m
m
ig
ra
n
t?
N
o
t
s
o
fa
s
t. Figure 4:
pattern or government color. However, liberalgovernments (such as the center-left governmentof Slovenia, or the left-liberal government ofCroatia) continue to have a positive rhetorictowards migrants. The pattern of whether the leftor the right presents positive or negative rhetoric isclosely associated with the political patternsdescribed above.Second, the table demonstrates anassociation between the political pattern expectedin a country, and which color of governmentenacts restrictive policy changes. For example, thetechnocratic liberal government of Romania andthe centrist government of Lithuania amendnational legislation so that it is in line with EU’sregulations. On the contrary, and in line withtheoretical expectations, the left-wing conservativegovernment of Slovakia introduces bordercontrols. In Latvia, it is the right-wing conservativegovernment that enacts restrictive migration laws.In sum, the political patterns of Eastern Europeindicate the type of policy change that differentcolors of government are likely to follow.In the long-run, the most obviousexpectation concerning immigration policies inEastern Europe is that, like in the west, thesepolicies will be extensively contested by thecompeting liberal and conservative forces withineach country. Who falls on which side of this
divide will be dominantly determined by their long-standing views of ethnic minorities. Secondly,given the potent political opportunity offered bythe migration crisis to the conservative camps, andthe assertive use of this opportunity by some keyactors, we should expect a significant rise ofopposition to immigration on the part of thepublic, which will further strengthen theconservative side of the political divide.
Conclusion
The seemingly simple story of policyuniformity among Eastern European countries onthe issue of immigration is now revealed as a muchmore complex aggregation of diverse politicalviews based on attitudes towards ethnic minorities.In contexts where the left generally supports ethnicminorities due to its past affinity with the federaldiaspora, these parties currently have more liberalimmigration positions. Left parties who do nothave this connection, however, are tending towardnationalist conservatism, particularly on the issueof immigration. And finally, in countries wherethere is no notable ethnic minority, positions onimmigration hinge on whether or not the ex-communist party reformed. In these contexts,including the Czech Republic, Hungary, andPoland, ideological principles about ethnicminorities now have a target group that was
w
w
w
.s
c
ie
n
c
e
s
p
o
.fr/lie
p
p
5Table 1
*An election occured in November 2015, however, the new government did not assume office until January 22, 2016.Source: This table was created by the author and references can be provided upon request.
previously absent in these relatively homogenouscountries. Incoming immigrants and refugees havebecome the new “other.” Subsequently, the real orpotential influx of migrants in the context of the2015 migration crisis has heightened the salienceof the immigration issue. While all countries onthe Balkan migration route imposed bordercontrols, the general rhetorical, as well as policyresponse to the crisis, is importantly determinedby the color of government and the politicalpatterning of eastern European countries. Asconcerns over the migration remain, policy stancesthroughout Eastern Europe will continue to bedriven by political views based on attitudestowards ethnic minorities
.
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